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LAYMAN V. STATE: THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT'S
RESPONSE TO RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW PRINCIPLE ON STATUTORILY
CREATED EMPLOYMENT AND RETIREMENT CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 4, 2006, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued its ruling in
Layman v. State,' a breach of contract action in response to the July 1, 2005
enactment of the State Retirement System Preservation and Investment Reform
Act 2 (Act 153). In this decision, the court held that the statute that created the
Teacher and Employee Retention Incentive Program 3 (TERI) established a
statutory contract between the state and participants who elected the program
prior to July 1, 2005 (old TERI participants).4 Further, the court held that the
specific provisions of Act 153, which required the old TERI participants to start
making retirement system contributions, constituted unlawful retroactive
legislation effectively resulting in a breach of contract on the part of the State
with regard to section 9-1-2210 of the South Carolina Code.5 As a result, the
court ordered the State to refund the contributions withheld from those TERI
participants with interest.6 Although the court explicitly stated that it did not
base its decision in Layman on "general principles of contract law,"7 the case
reveals the court's willingness to employ elements of private contract law to
determine whether the legislature intended to create fixed contractual rights
through statutory enactments, marking a significant change from state
precedent.8
1. 368 S.C. 631, 630 S.E.2d 265 (2006).
2. Act No. 153, 2005 S.C. Acts 1697 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-2210 (Supp. 2006)). The
Act was adopted on June 6, 2005, signed by the Governor on June 10, 2005, and became effective July
1, 2005. Id. at 1729.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-22 10 (Supp. 2004) (amended 2005).
4. Layman, 368 S.C. at 639, 630 S.E.2d at 269.
5. Id. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 270.
6. Id. at 644, 630 S.E.2d at 272.
7. Id. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 270.
8. See Ken Moorhead Oil Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 323 S.C. 532, 542-44,476 S.E.2d 481,
486-88 (1996) (holding that in the absence of an express contractual obligation mandating the state to
distribute funds in a particular way for the plaintiff's benefit, there was no interference by the state with
the plaintiff's reasonable expectations and thus no violation of the State or Federal contracts clause);
Alston v. City of Camden, 322 S.C. 38, 46, 471 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1996) (holding that the mandatory
language found in city ordinances describing terms of employment did not constitute express
contractual language and thus the ordinances were subject to modification by the state); S.C. Pub. Serv.
Auth. v. Summers, 282 S.C. 148, 154, 318 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1984) (finding statutorily created
contractual rights where they are unambiguously and expressly found in the language of the legislation).
1
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This Note focuses on the implications of this decision in South Carolina
regarding retirement and employment benefits legislation for state employees,
state agencies, and state law makers. Part II provides a brief background of the
statutory scheme surrounding the legislation at issue, an overview of the court's
decision, and a summary of the rationale and principles applied by the court in
its holding. Part III delineates the three factors the court relied on in Layman to
find that the TERI statute created a contract between the state and TERI
participants and argues, by incorporating principles generally associated with
contract law, that the court broadened the scope of when a statute creates a
legally binding contract. Part IV of this Note discusses the legislative
implications of this decision and provides some recommendations for future
legislation. Part V concludes.
II. THE DECISION
A. Background: The South Carolina Retirement System, the TERI
Program, and the Working Retiree Statute
The statutory origins of the South Carolina Retirement System date to 1945
when the state passed legislation creating retirement benefits for public
employees.9 Today, all South Carolina state employees are required to
participate in the State Retirement System (system).' ° On January 1, 2001, the
General Assembly enacted legislation referred to as "the old TERI statute,""
establishing a program enabling state employees to continue to work for up to
five years after electing to retire.'2 Participation in the TERI program is
voluntary, 13 and during the TERI period, the state places the employee's
retirement benefits into an interest-free escrow account. 14 The state employer
must continue to pay into the system for each TERI participant during the
participant's period of enrollment. 5 Once enrolled, the old TERI participants
still worked and were paid just as before they elected to participate in the TERI
program.'6 However, because they were technically retired, the old TERI
participants did not have to make contributions to the retirement system and
stopped accruing service credit during their enrollment.' 7 Additionally, enrolling
in the TERI program renders participants ineliglible for the state's group life
9. See South Carolina Retirement System, Act No. 157, 1945 S.C. Acts 212, 234.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-420 (1986).
11. Act No. 1, § 2.A.1, 2001 S.C. Acts 2, 26-33.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-22 10 (Supp. 2004) (amended 2005).
13. Id. § 9-1-2210(A).
14. Id. § 9-1-2210(B). TERI participants' retirement benefits are considered fixed on the date they
elect to participate in the program and are calculated based on the service credit and the member's
average final compensation at the time the program period begins. Id. § 9-1-2210(A).
15. Id. § 9-1-2210(B).
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insurance and disability retirement benefits. 8 According to estimates presented
by the State in Layman, approximately 12,000 people participated in TERI in
2004.'9
South Carolina also maintains another mechanism for retiree employment.2"
Under the "old working retiree statute," state employees who had been retired
for at least sixty days could take a job with a state employer and maintain their
monthly retirement benefits, so long as their salaries did not exceed $50,000.2!
Unlike TERI participants, working retirees are able to receive their salaries as
well as their retirement benefits. 22 Similar to the old TERI statute, however, the
original terms of the old working retiree statute did not allow a working retiree
to accrue additional service credits, and in return, the participants were not
required to make further contributions to the system after reemployment.2 3
On July 1, 2005, Act 153 went into effect, amending several statutes relating
to the operation of the system.24 The provision of Act 153 at the heart of the
dispute in Layman required the TERI participants to begin making contributions
to the retirement system of 6.25% of their gross pay.25 Act 153 also mandated
that working retirees under the old working retiree statute begin making
contributions to the retirement system.
26
B. Procedural History and Facts
The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petitioners' motion for
original jurisdiction in Layman and certified a class action, with the class
consisting of: (1) all persons who elected TERI before July 1, 2005, who were
employed by a state employer (old TERI participants); and (2) all retired
members of the system who returned to employment covered by the state
retirement system before July 1, 2005, as provided in section 9-1-1790 (old
working retirees).27 The court also ordered the State to transfer all of the
retirement system contributions withheld from the old TERI participants and old
working retirees since the time Act 153 went into effect into an interest bearing
account for the duration of the litigation. 8
18. Id.
19. Brief of Petitioners at 8, Layman v. State, 368 S.C. 631, 630 S.E.2d 265 (2006) (No. 26146)
(citation omitted).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-1790 (Supp. 2004) [hereinafter "old working retiree statute"] (amended
2005) (The 2005 amendment rewrote subsection (a), deleting the provision limiting the salary potential




24. State Retirement System Preservation and Investment Reform Act, Act No. 153, 2005 S.C.
Acts 1697, 1729 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-2210 (Supp. 2006)).
25. Id. § 2 at 1705, 1707.
26. Id. § 7 at 1709.




Lollar: Layman v. State: The South Carolina Supreme Court's Response to R
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The petitioners' primary legal argument was that, before July 1, 2005, the
statutory provisions of the old TERI program and the old working retiree statute
constituted legally binding contracts between the State and the class members.29
The petitioners based this argument on general principles of contract law.3"
Specifically, they asserted "the statutory provisions of the TERI program and the
retirement system's treatment of working retirees constituted a contractual offer,
and upon acceptance by the employee, constituted a binding contract with the
state of South Carolina."'"
In response to the petitioners' claims, the State argued that precedent
mandates a strong presumption against legislation having created contractual
obligations.32 In addition, the State countered that the petitioners' primary
argument that the statute gave rise to a contract had no merit because the court
had never applied principles of private contract law to determine the existence of
statutory contracts.' 3
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the old TERI statute created a
legally binding contract, and the State breached this contract by forcing the old
TERI participants, through Act 153, to make contributions to the retirement
system.34  The court ordered the State to return all retirement system
contributions withheld from the old TERI participants with interest and
mandated that the State be enjoined from collecting any further contributions
from these participants in the future. 35 Because the court found that the old TERI
statute created a legally binding contract, it did not address the petitioners'
estoppel, takings, or due process claims.36 With regard to the working retirees
claim, the court held that the old working retirees statute did not contain "the
same contractually significant language as utilized in the old TERI statute.
37
"[The] old working retiree statute [did] not evidence an intent by the legislature
to be bound to any terms related to the [statute]. 38
29. Id.; Brief of Petitioners, supra note 19, at 10. The Petitioners also argued that the State should
be estopped from requiring the class members to make contributions to the system and that the
enactment of Act 153 represents an unconstitutional taking and deprivation of the class members'
property without due process of law, in violation of both the South Carolina and Federal constitutions.
Layman, 368 S.C. at 636, 630 S.E.2d at 268.
30. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 19, at 12 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 10; see Layman, 368 S.C. at 637, 630 S.E.2d at 268.
32. Brief of Respondents at 12-13, Layman v. State, 368 S.C. 631, 630 S.E.2d 265 (2006) (No.
26146).
33. Id. at 14.
34. Layman, 368 S.C. at 642, 630 S.E.2d at 271.
35. Id. at 644, 630 S.E.2d at 272.
36. Id. at 643, 630 S.E.2d at 272.
37. Id. at 643, 630 S.E.2d at 271.
38. Id. The court granted the State's request for decertification of the class and remanded the
individual petitioners' breach of contract claims under the old working retiree statute, noting that some
of these petitioners may have claims based on individual contracts with their employers as well as
estoppel arguments. Id. at 643, 630 S.E.2d at 271. In an order published following the decision, the
court denied the petitioners' motion for payment of attorney's fees according to the common fund
doctrine and remanded the issue of whether the petitioners are entitled to recover reasonable attorney's
[Vol. 58: 477
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C. Holding and Reasoning
In Layman, the court's analysis focused on determining legislative intent
through the express language in the old TER] statute. The court held that the old
TERI statute contained explicit language that evidenced the legislature's intent
to create a binding contract: "While our rule has been, and continues to be, that
statutes do not create contracts that bind the State, the State may not utilize such
significant contractual language and disregard its plain meaning and practical
effect."39 As the court stated, "Far from simply describing the terms of old TERI
participants' employment,... [t]he old TERI statute fixed obligations, required
affirmative actions by both the State and old TERI program participants, and
contained contractually significant language."40
The court distinguished Layman from its decision in Alston v. City of
Camden.4 Most importantly, the court noted that Alston dealt with "fringe
benefits" set forth in a city ordinance, whereas Layman dealt with a statute
creating a defined employment program.42 The court also pointed out that the
employees in Alston had a reasonable expectation that their benefits might be
subject to unilateral modification, whereas the terms of the old TERI statute
required state employees to elect to participate in the TERI program and consent
to its limitations in order to receive the benefit of working for the state at full
salary without contributing to the retirement system.43 Finally, the court noted
that "[u]nlike the city ordinance in Alston, Act 153 sought to materially alter
terms which formed a substantial part of the basis for the bargain struck between
the State and old TERI participants."44
After evaluating the language in the statute, the obligations inferred from its
terms, and the distinctions between the old TERI program and the city ordinance
in Alston, the court concluded that the legislature intended the old TERI statute
to constitute a legally binding contract.45 Accordingly, the court held that the
specific provisions of Act 153 that required the old TERI participants to make
contributions to the retirement system constituted an unlawful breach of contract
by the State.46
fees to be taxed as court costs against the State and the retirement system. Id. at 648, 630 S.E.2d at 274
(order disposing of post-hearing motions). On remand, the circuit court ordered the State to pay almost
$8.7 million in legal fees to the petitioners' attorneys. Order Granting Attorney's Fees at 10, Layman
v. State, Civ. Action No. 05-CP-40-2785 (Cir. Ct. Feb. 14, 2007) (Breeden, J.). The defendants have
filed a motion to reconsider. Defendants' Amended Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Layman v.
State, Civ. Action No. 05-CP-40-2785 (Cir. Ct. Mar. 5, 2007).
39. Id. at 639, 640, 630 S.E.2d at 270.
40. Id. at 639, 630 S.E.2d at 269.
41. Id. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 270 (citing Alston v. City of Camden, 322 S.C. 39, 45, 471 S.E.2d
174, 177 (1996)).
42. Id. (citing Alston, 322 S.C. at 48, 471 S.E.2d at 179).
43. Id. at 639, 640-41, 630 S.E.2d at 269-70 (citing Alston, 322 S.C. at 48, 471 S.E.2d at 179).
44. Id. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 269.
45. Id. at 642, 630 S.E.2d at 271.
46. Id. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 269-70.
2007]
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Layman Factors: When Does a South Carolina Statute Create a
Contract Between the State and State Employees?
Despite the court's assertion in Layman that its decision was not grounded
in "general principles of contract law," 47 the opinion suggests a new willingness
of the court to employ elements of private contract law to determine whether the
legislature intended to create fixed contractual rights through statutory
enactments-a clear shift from precedent. The court in Layman effectively
established a three-part test to determine whether legislation affecting retirement
or employment benefits creates a legally binding contract between the state and
state employees: (1) does the statute contain express contractual language
indicating the existence of a mutual obligation; (2) does the statute require
affirmative actions by both the state and state employees; and (3) do the terms of
the statute outline a defined employment program or merely general terms of
employment subject to unilateral modification by the government employer? In
an effort to fully understand and articulate the law established in Layman and its
effect on future litigation, it is necessary to further examine the three
requirements of a statutory contract as recognized by the court.
1. Does the Statute Contain Express Contractual Language Indicating
the Existence of a Mutual Obligation?
In Layman, the court acknowledged its adherence to the general principle
established by the United States Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger
Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.: "Generally, statutes do not
create contractual rights. However, if the statute indicates that the legislature
intended to bind itself contractually, a contract may be found to exist., 48 The
South Carolina court noted that the first indication of legislative intent is the
language utilized in the statute.49 In a previous South Carolina case addressing
the issue of contractually binding statutory language, S.C. Public Service
Authority v. Summers, the court held that contractual rights are created by statute
only when they are expressly found in the language of the legislation.5 ° The
statutory language at issue in Summers stated the following:
The State of South Carolina does hereby pledge to agree with
any person, firm or corporation... acquiring the notes, bonds,
47. Id. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 270.
48. Id at 637-38, 630 S.E.2d at 268 (internal citation omitted) (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985)).
49. Id. at 638,630 S.E.2d at 269 (citing S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Summers, 282 S.C. 148, 154,318
S.E.2d 113, 116 (1984)).
50. Summers, 282 S.C. at 154, 318 S.E.2d at 116.
[Vol. 58: 477
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evidence of indebtedness or other obligations to be issued by
the Public Service Authority for the construction of any project,
that the State will not alter or limit the rights hereby vested in
the Public Service Authority until the said notes, bonds,
evidence of indebtedness or other obligations, together with the
interest thereon, are fully met and discharged. . .."
The State argued in Layman that, given the precedent established in
Summers, nothing within the language of the old TERI program nor the old
working retiree statute evidenced an intent of the General Assembly to create
contractual rights.52 The State's argument centered on the fact that neither the
old TERI statute nor the old working retiree statute specified that it was a
"contract" or contained terms "typically associated with contractual
relationships, such as 'covenant' or 'pledge.' 53 Rejecting this argument, the
court held that language utilized in several provisions of the old TERI statute
was sufficient to satisfy the express contractual language requirement.54 The
court referred to several specific provisions of the old TERI statute:
(A) [A] . . . member who is eligible [to retire under TERI].
and complies with the requirements of this article . . . .shall
55agree ....
(B) During the specified program period, receipt of the
member's normal retirement benefit is deferred. The member's
[]monthly benefit must be placed in the system's trust fund on
behalf of the member.56
(D) A program participant is retired from the retirement system
as of the beginning of the program period. A program
participant makes no further employee contributions to the
system, accrues no service credit during the program period,
and is not eligible to receive group life insurance benefits or
disability retirement benefits."
The Layman decision demonstrates that the court has broadened the scope
of what it considers to be expressly contractual language to include any
51. Id. at 154, 318 S.E.2d at 116 (emphasis added) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-31-30 (1976)).
52. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 32, at 14 (citing Summers, 282 S.C. at 154, 318 S.E.2d
at 116).
53. Id. at 15. The State also argued that the old TERI statute utilizes "the term 'program,' which
connotes transience and flexibility not generally associated with immutable obligations." 1d.
54. Layman, 368 S.C. at 639, 630 S.E.2d at 269.
55. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-2210(A) (Supp. 2004) (amended 2005)).
56. Id. at 638, 630 S.E.2d at 269 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-2210(B) (Supp. 2004) (amended
2005) (emphasis added)).
57. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-2210(D) (Supp. 2004) (amended 2005) (emphasis added)).
2007]
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language that is indicative of the existence of a mutual obligation. Contrary to
the State's presumption in Layman, the Court no longer requires that language
"typically associated with contractual relationships"58 be used to create a
statutory contract.5 9 This Note describes the broadening of South Carolina case
law regarding statutorily based contracts; however it is important to recognize
that the court's decision in Layman remains limited, particularly in light of the
court's insistance that "statutes do not create contracts that bind the State. 6 °
Although Layman indicates an expansion of the kinds of statutory language that
may give rise to a contract, the presumption against statutes creating contracts
still remains strong.6' In Alston, for example, the court noted that mandatory
language in city ordinances describing terms of employment does not fall within
the purview of express contractual language. 62 The court suggested that this type
of "mandatory language is just as consistent with an intent to have a uniform
policy as with an intent to enter into contracts. 63 Moreover, in Layman, the
court was clear in concluding to the contrary, holding that the language utilized
in the old working retiree statute "did not evidence intent by the legislature to be
bound to any of its terms. 64
2. Does the Statute Require Affirmative Actions by Both the State and
the State Employees?
In addition to finding contractually significant language in the old TERI
statute, the court also emphasized that the statute "fixed obligations [and]
required affirmative actions by both the State and old TERI program
participants., 65 The old TERI statute permitted participants to continue working
for up to five years; however, the participants gave up the opportunity to accrue
further service credit. 6 Accordingly, although old TERI participants were
eligible to receive salary increases during their five year TERI period, each
participant's retirement benefits became fixed at the date the participant elected
to take part in the program.67 The legislature designed the old TERI program to
confer a mutual benefit; the state promised that the old TERI participants would
not have to make further contributions to the System, and in return it "was able
58. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 32, at 15.
59. See Layman, 368 S.C. at 639, 638 S.E.2d at 269.
60. Id. at 641, 638 S.E.2d at 270.
61. Id. at 644, 630 S.E.2d at 272 ("[O]ur decision today is a very narrow one which affects only
those TERI participants who joined the old TERI program, originally enacted in 2001, prior to July 1,
2005").
62. Alston v. City of Camden, 322 S.C. 39, 47, 471 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1996).
63. Id.
64. Layman, 368 S.C. at 643, 630 S.E.2d at 271.
65. Id. at 639, 630 S.E.2d at 269.
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to retain a large number of experienced and well-trained employees" for an
extended period of time.68
In the court's consideration of this aspect of the old TERI statute, it applied
well-established principles of contract law and recognized that "once the bargain
is formed, and the obligations set, a contract may only be altered by mutual
agreement and for further consideration. '69 Act 153 required the current TERI
participants to start making contributions of 6.25% of their gross income to the
retirement system; however, it did not change the fact that these participants
were not eligible to accrue additional service credits or receive any other
offsetting benefit during their period of participation.7" The court found that the
terms of the old TERI statute created a bilateral contract rather than a unilateral
agreement." Accordingly, the court held that the State could not unilaterally
alter its agreement with the old TERI participants without their mutual consent
and additional consideration.72
3. Do the Terms of the Statute Outline a Defined Employment
Program or Merely General Terms of Employment Subject to
Unilateral Modification?
In Alston, the court affirmed the general principle that "public employees
generally have no contractual rights in their employment merely by virtue of a
statute describing the terms of that employment."73 However, in Layman the
court found that when a statute does more than describe the terms of
employment, this general principle does not apply.74 In finding that the terms of
the old TERI statute were distinguishable from the city ordinance in Alston, the
court noted that the old TERI statute did not merely describe the terms of
employment but instead specified eligibility and enrollment criteria as well as
the benefits and procedures for an employment program.75 Contrary to the
court's assertion that its decision was based exclusively on statutory
interpretation, the court applied principles of contract law in noting that,
"[u]nlike the city ordinance in Alston, Act 153 sought to materially alter terms
which formed a substantial part of the basis for the bargain struck between the
State and old TERI participants.
76
The court also considered additional factors in deciding how to classify the
old TERI statute. These factors included whether or not the employment
68. Id.
69. Id. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 269.
70. State Retirement System Preservation and Investment Reform Act, Act No. 153, 2005 S.C.
Acts 1697, 1702, 1705 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-2210 (Supp. 2006)).
71. Layman, 368 S.C. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 270.
72. Id. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 269-70.
73. Alston v. City of Camden, 322 S.C. 39, 45, 471 S.E.2d 174, 177 (1996).
74. Layman, 368 S.C. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 270.
75. Id. at 640-41, 630 S.E.2d at 270.
76. Id. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 270.
2007]
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program was voluntary, as well as whether or not the employees who elected the
program had a reasonable expectation that their benefits might be subject to
unilateral modification." Because the old TERI participants voluntarily elected
to have their retirement benefits determined at the time of TERI enrollment and
willingly gave up the ability to accrue additional service credit, these
participants possessed a reasonable expectation that the benefit of not having to
make further retirement contributions would go unchanged.
This analysis of what constitutes a statutorily based contract under South
Carolina case law following Layman may raise doubts as to whether the court
has departed from its previously affirmed policy rationale as expressed in Alston
on this issue: "Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and
repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not clearly and
unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the essential powers of a
legislative body. '7 8 However, the court's holding in Layman can still be
reconciled with this policy rationale as a South Carolina statute will only create
a contract when the legislature intends to create a contract, the terms of the
statute clearly and unequivocally indicate a mutual obligation, and the state
employees who are covered under the statute possess a "reasonable expectation"
that the terms are not subject to change.
IV. SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Layman clearly indicates the South Carolina legislature cannot retroactively
amend the statutes that set the required contributions to the retirement system;
79
however, the decision raises the question as to what other terms and conditions
of public employment are beyond the legislature's authority to modify. In
Layman, the court recognized that "[li]t is fully within the power of the
legislature to make changes to laws that impact future participants, but ... the
State breached its contract with the old TERI participants by changing the terms
of the existing statutory agreement after participants agreed to those terms by
electing to retire."8 The court suggested that Act 153 "should have exempted
old TERI participants from all portions of Act 153 related to the new TERI
program, instead of applying new legislation to old TERI participants."'"
One lesson the South Carolina General Assembly should draw from Layman
is that any well-drafted future legislation should incorporate express clauses
notifying potential beneficiaries that the General Assembly retains its power to
amend the law or certain provisions of the law.82 This recommendation has been
77. Id. at 640, 630 S.E.2d at 270.
78. Alston v. City of Camden, 322 S.C. 39, 46, 471 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1996) (quoting Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985)).
79. Layman, 368 S.C. at 644, 630 S.E.2d at 272.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 640 n.7, 630 S.E.2d at 270 n.7.
82. See, e.g., Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)
(discussing how words of reservation made amendment permissible).
[Vol. 58: 477
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expressed in multiple jurisdictions regarding similar issues of retroactive
legislation.83 The United States Supreme Court has also recognized this
legislative recommendation:
Legislation outlining the terms on which private parties may
execute contracts does not on its own constitute a statutory
contract, but is instead an articulated policy that, like all
policies, is subject to revision or repeal. Indeed, lest there be
any doubt in these cases about Congress' will, Congress
"expressly reserved" its rights to "repeal, alter, or amend" the
Act at any time.84
Another consideration is that adjudication of issues regarding retroactive
legislation results in inefficient use of the state's judicial and legislative
resources. For example, in Layman the court noted that, at the same time as the
litigation, a bill was introduced in the legislature which, if passed, would
override the Act 153 provisions disputed in Layman.85 In other words, the bill
would have had the same effect as the court's decision, with the exception of the
actual refund to the state employees. In addition, litigation against the State
could deplete public financial resources. Upon remand of Layman, the circuit
court ordered the State to pay the petitioners' attorneys almost $8.7 million in
legal fees, one of the highest awards in South Carolina history.86 In order to
satisfy this judgment, the State may have to use "funds set aside to pay pensions,
including cost-of-living adjustments, or ask[] taxpayers to pay" for the fees
directly.87
V. CONCLUSION
The Layman decision is significant because it broadens the standard
regarding what constitutes a statutorily created contract in South Carolina.
Although the court asserts that it does not apply general principles of contract
law to determine if a statute creates a contract, Layman suggests the court will
apply a test that incorporates components of general contract law to resolve the
83. See, e.g., Murray County Sch. Dist. v. Adams, 461 S.E.2d 228, 230-31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
(citations omitted) (noting that any attempt to reduce or terminate benefits for government employees
that are established by a statute or ordinance is prohibited by the Impairment of Contracts Clause, but
where the statute itself provides that it is subject to legislative change, it may be amended, as no vested
right to unchanged benefits is created).
84. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,466 (1985)
(construing the Rail Passenger Service Act, 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1976) (repealed 1994)).
85. Layman, 368 S.C. at 642, 630 S.E.2d at 271 (citing H. 4544, 116th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg.
Sess. (S.C. Jan. 31, 2006)).
86. See supra note 38; Ben Werner, State to Appeal $8.7 Million Legal Fee, MYRTLE BEACH SUN
NEWS, Mar. 2, 2007; see also Opinion, Excessive Attorney Fee Highlights Flaw in Law, Lawmakers,
THE STATE, Mar. 8, 2007.
87. Werner, supra note 86 (quoting Mike Sponhour, State Budget and Control Board spokesman).
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question of whether the legislature meant to establish contractual rights through
the enactment of statutes. The factors the court will consider include whether the
statute contains language indicative of a mutual obligation, whether the statute
requires both the state and the state employee to take specific action to create the
relationship, and whether the terms of the statute define a particular employment
program. The holding in Layman also suggests that future South Carolina
legislation should contain express language indicating whether or not it is
subject to modification or amendment, particularly when legislation affects state
retirement and employment benefits.
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